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Abstract: The minimal state concept of the neo-liberal policy agenda was queried 
worldwide after the 2007/8 global financial crisis. Increased state intervention differed in 
its scope and durability in various capitalist models. Countries with stable and strong 
democratic political and market economic institutions witnessed a brief episode of 
nationalizations that was soon followed by the sale of acquired assets. However, new 
democracies responded differently. In most emerging market economies, post-communist 
and developing countries alike, increased state intervention remained in place and was 
used to various political purposes. These ranged from large-scale development programs 
to simple political rent seeking. The paper concludes that weak social and international 
control over political institutions may result in rolling back of democratic political 
institutions and drastic weakening of market economic institutions, the rule of law and 
competition.   
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1. Introduction 
State has always been an important actor of social life during modern history. Areas 
and tools of state intervention changed remarkably over time also in connection with social 
perceptions and political institutions. The role of the state has always been a political issue 
including its involvement in the economy. Therefore, state performance can be analyzed 
both from the technical and the political aspect. During the age of modern capitalism three 
periods of intensive state activity could be observed. As Nölke (2014) rightly indicated, 
after the late 19th century economic nationalism and the Keynesian (and corporatist) 
decades of the 20th century, the new period of statism in the 2000’s is already the third 
state-led paradigm of the capitalist world. The three periods had very different features 
from the technical viewpoint (the usage of economic policy tools) but also from the 
political aspect (whose interests were served by the state intervention). Therefore we can 
compare the three periods only by proper analysis of not only state policies but also the 
world economic environment and political conditions of the time. Obviously, the 
government policy toolkit depended on both internal and external political conditions 
prevailing political concepts and social perceptions. 
1 Paper presented at the 12th Hungarian-Romanian round table, Bucharest, October 11, 2018. This is an 
amended and shortened version of the introductory chapter in Szanyi (2019). 
140 
                                                     
2. Typology of economic and political systems based on the state’s 
role 
In a useful analytical approach of the late 20th century transition economies Kornai 
(2016) differentiated between two main types of economic and political systems. Liberal 
democracy goes together with free market economy principle. Dictatorship is bound with 
bureaucratic control and coordination of the economy. Of course, most market economies 
are somewhere in between. In the group of countries with more stable and long traditions 
of political democracy and free market economy there are countries that traditionally have 
more state influence in the economy (France) than others (Britain). The political scene also 
shows different institutional systems. Market economic institutions are sometimes coupled 
with weak democratic institutions and influential charismatic leaders. In such autocracies 
we can usually see high level of centralization in decision making that provides stronger 
control of the state over the economy. Historically we can also observe in some countries 
oscillation between the basic state concepts: autocracy (dictatorship) and liberal democracy 
(Kornai, 2016). 
Nations, countries are diverse concerning their historical, cultural heritage, natural 
and human endowments, level of development. Therefore, Kornai’s dichotomy can be 
applied only on rather high levels of abstraction. The “Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) 
literature (see: Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 2003 and many others) identifies 
significant differences of capitalist models within the relatively homogenous countries of 
core Europe. This is despite that these countries are regarded as liberal democracies and 
also free market economies. Moreover, their political orientation and institutional systems 
were streamlined in the European integration process. The basic principles of economic 
integration described the potential benefits of increased homogeneity of the single 
European market. On the other hand, the globalization process has also triggered important 
spontaneous as well as institutionally initiated streamlining in many areas of social life 
reaching from consumerism enforced by multinational business to capital market 
liberalization suggested by international organizations. Nevertheless, Gerschenkornian 
diversity prevailed. An important object of study within the theme of capitalist diversity is 
the economic role of the state. 
During the late XX century the neo-liberal agenda has developed into a pervasive 
principle that claimed exclusive influence in economics, economic policy and education 
(see e.g. Csaba, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010). The neo-liberal approach to the role of the state was 
rather conservative and emphasized the principle of minimal state. Due to the strong 
pressure from the monetarist school starting from the mid-1980s pervasive state 
intervention was scaled back drastically. Ronald Reagan’s America and Margaret 
Thatcher’s Britain took the lead in the liberalization and deregulation of the markets. In 
Britain also massive privatization of state-owned companies took place: direct state 
intervention was curtailed. To a lesser extent similar policies were applied in many 
developed economies. Moreover, international organizations (strongly influenced by the 
USA and its economic policy paradigm) suggested similar policies to countries of different 
development level and cultural, institutional heritage. Minimal state became a buzzword of 
the last two decades of the XX century. Liberalization, deregulation, privatization was 
reinforced in many developing countries and emerging market economies including 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).  
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The agenda produced a rather smooth development pattern in developed market 
economies. The period of the “Great Moderation” from the 1990s to the 2007 financial 
crisis showed fairly stable and significant economic growth in the developed part of the 
world. One could conclude that the minimal state concept could work if proper market 
economic institutions effectively regulated markets and the economy in general. Warning 
signs of repeatedly occurring currency crises in Latin-America and South-East Asia were 
neglected in the belief that on the long run reasons of these problems could be also lifted if 
market institutions were properly developed. The concept was only slightly amended to 
consider local circumstances in the implementation of suggested policies. The fundamental 
goal of introducing liberal market economy in any country was not changed. Also, chaos in 
the Yeltsin era Russian economy did not shake mainstream economists’ firm belief in the 
omnipotent minimal state concept (see Fukuyama, 1992). It was shaken only by the 2007 
financial crisis that showed the limits of liberal market economic institutions’ regulatory 
effect in the global economy. 
3. Post-2008/9 crisis: Increased state interventionism versus 
minimal state 
Economic concepts were reconsidered in many countries after the 2008/9 world 
economic crisis. The devastating effect of the unexpected financial crisis could be limited 
only by massive state intervention. Meltdown of the global financial system was prevented 
by bailing out the largest global financial institutions in the USA and in Europe. Various 
techniques were applied. Nevertheless, the outcome was generally a massive increase of 
state ownership in the financial sector (Voszka, 2017). In some cases too big to fail 
industrial corporations received the same treatment. The myth of the omnipotent self-
regulating markets was blast. The state had to come back in the most developed advocates 
of the neo-liberal concept, too. The revival of the state has become a general phenomenon 
in the world economy. However, it affected the various regions and countries differently. 
The depth and direction of changes in policy concepts regarding direct state intervention 
very much depended on the historic and cultural heritage. While broad state intervention in 
the economy has had long traditions in France (Somai, 2017), British or German traditions 
suggested a more rapid and possibly full retreat (just to take examples from developed 
world). Emerging market economies in the Third World but also in CEE possessed much 
weaker market institutions and became rather skeptical about the application of the 
minimal state concept in their countries already prior to the 2008/9 crisis. Most countries 
of these regions did not hesitate to take the now much easier opportunity to increase 
economic intervention of the state for the longer run. 
Diffusing empirical evidence of economic policies shows therefore increasing 
diversity parallel with the weakening of the neo-liberal principles. For example, the 
European Union continued reinforcing the paragraphs of the Maastricht Treaty in its 
neighborhood policy (e.g. in the Western Balkans), meanwhile a significant group of EU 
member states (with the lead of Hungary and Poland) openly queried the validity of the 
political and institutional fundamentals of the same agreement. State permeated economies 
(Nölke, 2014; 2015) emerged and played roles in world economic labor division that were 
previously reserved by mainstream economic thought to highly developed economies only 
(e.g. foreign direct investments). For decades, economic development in Africa could not 
be successfully triggered with policies suggested by mainstream international financial 
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institutions but rather by new policy approaches of the past decade that understood better 
and considered more local realities (see Diao et al., 2017).  
The interpretation of post crisis development patterns is by far not straightforward. 
This is the reason of increased research interest in comparative economics. The evolving 
concept of state capitalism (Nölke, 2014; Kurlantzick, 2016) regards increased state 
intervention as the main driver of current changes in the world economy. Current studies 
on state capitalism emphasize not only the role of the state in economic coordination, but 
also the multifaceted interplay of social, political and economic institutions affecting 
various dimensions of state activity. What stands clear is the possibility of parallel 
existence and development of several capitalist models that have their own internal logic 
and considerable stability. In this regard, the idea of VoC literature that describes 
variations within the Western world’s free market economy models needs further 
development.  
4. Particularities of the actual phase of state interventionism and 
the broadening VoC 
Earlier, the VoC literature (based on the analytical framework laid down by Hall and 
Soskice, 2001 and Amable, 2003) did not tackle this issue. The analysis of the state’s role 
was restricted mainly on market regulations and the size of the central budget, degree of 
income redistribution (see e.g. Sapir, 2006). Research on increased state intervention is in 
an early stage. Nölke (2014, 2015) put the main emphasis on the development of globally 
successful national champions in large emerging market economies. By doing this he 
concentrated on the technical aspect of state intervention in four large emerging market 
economies (Brazil, India, China, South Africa – BICS). Kurlantzick (2016) compared 
countries with high share of state owned enterprises (SOEs) in the production from 
political economy viewpoints (a rather heterogeneous group of countries among others 
Norway, Singapore or Thailand).  
State ownership is just one aspect of spreading state intervention. The current revival 
of the state in matters of the economy represents a rather complex systemic change that 
also involves changes in economic and market regulations, development policy, social 
policies and possesses strong linkages to political institutions. Therefore, comprehensive 
political economy approach to the role of state in the economy is applicable. We can list 
some typical features that were frequently observed in countries where state involvement 
in the economy increased during the 2000s and especially after the 2008/9 crisis. 
Kurlantzick (2016) listed besides the high share of SOEs in GDP production the general 
decline of free market policies (as listed by the Fraser Institute). Economic regulation in 
general became selective, discriminative, and nationalist. Selective policies thwart 
competition on selected markets: mainly in finance/banking, public utility services, energy, 
gas and oil industry and supply. These are branches of strategic importance from the 
political viewpoint: through manipulated prices governments can successfully influence 
consumption. Imprints of state paternalism from pre-Washington Consensus periods are 
still strongly felt in many emerging market economies. Therefore, cheap public utility 
prices are important factors of political competition. 
This of course also means deliberate new detour from the classic liberal democratic 
principles of political competition. Nordhaus (1975) developed the theory of the political 
budget cycles (PBC), a predecessor of the economy-polity interactions of emerging market 
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economies. The theory argued that average voters were short-sighted and learned slowly, 
that provided opportunities for the manipulation of elections through excessive public 
spending. Though some empirical evidence suggested that over several election periods the 
effect might flatten because of social learning, the 2008/9 crisis seemed to return the 
tendency. Moreover, recent election campaigns showed an escalation of populism also in 
highly developed countries of the world. Therefore, there is a worldwide departure from 
the classic liberal principle of economy and polity separation. Because of these empirical 
facts the analysis of state capitalism should not necessarily be limited to emerging market 
economies as has been the case until now.  
Another important goal of increased state intervention is the development of national 
champions. These projects may also have important political implications because they 
increase national pride and boost the popularity of those politicians and governments who 
contributed. The economic development agenda is of course not new. Historic evidence 
puts this motive into the broad context of the core-periphery and developmental state 
literature (on this later see Ricz 2017). This ambition gained new impetus after the crisis. 
One important new feature in this regard is the changed international environment where 
large multinational enterprises increased entry barriers to most markets. It is therefore 
more difficult to successfully implement national champion development projects. An 
open question in this context is country size. Large countries can allocate significantly 
more resources to the usually state-owned national champions. Stable long-term financing 
of such projects is a primary condition of success. Nevertheless, the mounting evidence of 
unsuccessful cases calls for caution. Money alone cannot make wonders. On the other 
hand, there are also successful cases with small countries like Singapore. 
However, the national champion development programs, and excessive state 
ownership can fall easy prey of rent seeking. Kurlantzick (2016) states that the success of 
state development programs very much depends on the level of corruption. No country is 
absolutely free of corruption, and also state capitalist regimes show significant spread in 
this regard ranging from Singapore on the one hand with little state corruption to many 
post-Soviet countries with high corruption on the other. Systemic corruption has many 
levels, but the most damage is caused by public procurement tenders directed to cronies. 
There is ample evidence of big government projects of various countries that cost several 
times more in public expenditure than similar projects in countries with better public and 
institutional control on corruption. This practice threatens with the danger that “elite 
enrichment becomes the primary purpose of state enterprises” (ibid, p. 39). Besides SOEs, 
also partisan firms’ massive involvement in public procurement raises worries about 
increasing corruption and deteriorating efficiency in the usage of public money (Szanyi 
2016).  
Usually slow social learning described in PBC theory substantially deteriorated after 
the 2008/9 crisis. Washington Consensus promised welfare returns attached to increasing 
political and economic freedom that favored the middle class. But voters’ dissatisfaction 
with political freedom increased due to widening inequalities. After the 2008/9 crisis 
benefits realized by the middle class were also reduced. Increased state intervention 
therefore challenged the model of democracy and free market economy and promised 
welfare gains through increased state activity instead. This new attitude was perceived and 
welcomed by the societies of many countries as the revival of old paternalistic traditions. 
Changes in the perception of neo-liberal concept were reinforced also by the political elites 
that lacked personal commitment to democracy and free market economy. Kurlantzick 
(2016) listed many examples of elected political leaders becoming autocrats who 
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effectively rolled back democratic institutions with voters’ support in order to strengthen 
their political positions. The robustly expanding state sector played significant role in this 
process. 
The short list of successful state led development models (mainly in East-Asia) can 
not overshadow the potential flaws of excessive state intervention. These are connected to 
high levels of moral hazard, especially if business and polity relationships are not under 
institutional and social control. As it was mentioned, there have been many attempts to roll 
back democratic institutions in emerging market economies, thus, the danger of moral 
hazard is growing. There have been corruption scandals in many countries from China 
through Hungary to Brazil. Some of these cases reached highest political circles, like the 
imprisonment of former Brazilian president Lula. But besides corruption and outright theft 
there is also wide spread political rent seeking like overspending on social goals for 
political support (PBC) or on prestigious national programs like world soccer 
championships or Olympic games (Brazil, Russia, South Korea). State owned firms played 
an outstanding role in rent seeking and overspending. 
5. Conclusion 
Summing up, the weakening of the neoclassical paradigm after the 2008/9 crisis and 
the resulting increase in state intervention affected countries with different development 
levels (also concerning democratic institutions) differently. Social control, institutional 
embeddedness of the competition state concept prevented more developed countries from 
directly slipping into more autocratic system solutions. In countries with weaker and less 
traditional market economic and democratic political institutions erosion of these has 
started. Emerging state capitalist systems used increased state ownership for their own 
political legitimation and rent seeking. SOEs can be developed to globally competitive 
national champions, which can participate in politically motivated large development 
projects. They can also serve political rent seeking (in new forms of state paternalism) and 
also the enrichment of influential political lobbies. The balance between social goals and 
personal or partisan goals also depends on the strength of social control. Stronger control 
will induce policies targeting more social goals that serve political self interest (e.g. re-
election) only indirectly through rising popularity. This impact is not much different than 
excessive budgetary spending of PBC. However, deliberate rolling back of social 
institutions and increasing populism works in the opposite direction giving way to more 
direct forms of rent seeking. This in turn endangers also market economic institutions, the 
rule of law and weakens competition thus switching off the main drivers of classic 
capitalist systems. 
References: 
[1] Amable, B., The Diversity of Modern Capitalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003. 
[2] Clift, B., Woll, C., Economic patriotism: reinventing control over open markets. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 19:3, pp. 307-323, 2012. 
[3] Csaba, L., Orthodoxy, renewal and complexity in contemporary economics. Zeitschrift für 
Staats- und Europawissenscheften. 7:1, pp. 51-82, 2009. 
145 
[4] Diao, X., Hartgen, K. – McMillan, M., The Changing Structure of Africa’s Economies. 
Policy Research Working paper 7958. The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2017. 
[5] Hall, P., Soskice, D. eds., Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundations of 
Comparative Advantage. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001. 
[6] Kornai, J., The system paradigm revisited. Clarification and additions in the light of 
experiences in the post-socialist region. Acta Oeconomica, 66:4, 547-596, 2016. 
[7] Kurlantzick, J., State Capitalism. How the Return of Statism Is Transforming the World. 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2016. 
[8] Nordhaus, W. D., The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42: pp. 169-
90, 1975. 
[9] Nölke, A. ed., Multinational Corporations from Emerging Markets. State Capitalism 3.0. 
Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, 2014. 
[10] Nölke, A., Domestic structures, foreign economic policies and global economic order: 
Implications from the rise of large emerging economies. European Journal of International 
Relations. Vol. 21. No. 3: pp. 538-567, 2015. 
[11] Ricz, J., New developmentalist experiments in Brazil and Egypt: a comparative study. IWE 
Working Paper No. 227, 2017. 
[12] Sapir, A., Globalization and the Reform of European Social Models. Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 44:2, pp. 369-90, 2006. 
[13] Somai, M., Állami befolyás a francia gazdaságban: válságtól válságig. (State intervention in 
the French economy: From crisis to crisis) Külgazdaság 61:3-4, 51-73, 2017. 
[14] Stiglitz, J., Needed: a new economic paradigm. Financial Times, August 19, 2010 22:18, 
2010. 
[15] Szanyi, M., From party state capture to party business capture. Model feature of Visegrád 
countries? IWE Working paper No. 226, 2016. 
[16] Szanyi, M. (editor), State Ownership in Capitalist Models. CEU Press, Budapest 
(forthcoming), 2019. 
[17] Voszka, É., Nationalization or Privatization?: The Fragmentation of the Mainstream. Annals 
of Public and Cooperative Economics 88:1, 91-120, 2017. 
 
146 
